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Vorwort
Schon in seinen letzten Arbeitspapieren hat forost sich verstärkt den Fragen der 
europäischen Integration und dem umstrittenen Begriff der "Europäisierung" 
zugewandt. Während unmittelbar nach "der Wende" die Mitgliedschaft in der 
Europäischen Union für viele der ehemaligen Mitglieder des "Warschauer Pakts" 
als Garantie für Freiheit und Wohlstand galt, wird in zunehmendem Maß Kritik 
an dieser Union laut. Die Integration stellt sich in den Augen ihrer Kritiker 
häufig als Einbahnstraße dar: eine Art der Zwangsanpassung an die fest ge-
schriebenen Inhalte des Acquis Communautaire, des "gemeinsamen Besitz-
stands", die ihrer Meinung nach keine Chance auf Neubestimmung aufgrund der 
veränderten Bedingungen in Gesamteuropa zulassen. So scheint es, als ob 
diese Länder vom Regen in die Traufe gekommen wären.
Europa, so die Forderung, darf nicht gleichgesetzt werden mit der Europäischen 
Union und die Besonderheit einzelner Nationen nicht der "Gleichmacherei" west-
licher Prägung geopfert werden.
Auch wenn man diese Meinung nicht teilt, so setzt eine rationale Diskussion 
doch die Kenntnis der kritischen Argumente und Positionen voraus und der 
Quellen, aus der die Kritik gespeist wird. 
Im vorliegenden Band finden Sie höchst unterschiedliche Perspektiven und In-
terpretation zur Frage was die oft beschworene "Einheit in Vielfalt" denn aus-
macht. Gleichzeitig ist die Heterogenität, die in den einzelnen Beiträgen zum 
Ausdruck kommt, ihrerseits Zeichen der vielfältigen Variationen dieser Diskus-
sion.
Lesen Sie also im Folgenden kurze Blitzlichter auf die Ängste und Hoffnungen, 
die Skepsis und Fragen, wie sie sich aus dem Blickwinkel unterschiedlicher 
Länder und Interpretationen des "Europäischen Prozesses" darstellen. 
München, im Juni 2008 
Helga Schubert
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EU = Europe? 
Introduction
After a brief glance at this slender volume, one may have the impression that 
its articles are all too heterogeneous, that the collection itself is a reflection of 
the European Union’s slogan of “unity in diversity.” The thematic breadth is, 
however, not a mistake. The volume does not strive to present a homogenous 
picture of Europe, Euroskepticism, and the EU from a particular academic 
discipline in a particular country. Instead, it offers views from four different 
countries, from both East and West, and many disciplines in an endeavor to 
provide an adequate, European answer to an only seemingly simple question: 
Is the EU the same as Europe?
The volume opens with Vladimir Gvozden’s very personal study of Euro-
skepticism and the project of building a common Europe. Gvozden explores 
central questions of how Euroskepticism arises, what it is responding to, and 
whether it is possible to find any common ground, any unity in diversity to 
promote Europe. In the second article, “Europeanism,” we turn from general 
thoughts on European integration to summarize the critical views on the 
rhetoric of the EU and European thought as it is presented both by Czech 
“Eurorealists” as well as younger skeptics. This is followed by Andrej Nosko’s 
overview of Euroskepticism as a political phenomenon in Slovakia. Norway, 
which unlike Slovakia is often mistaken for a member state of the EU, is the 
topic of Christoffer Grønstad’s article. He poses the question whether Norway 
will soon join the EU and attempts an answer by looking at political programs 
and some particularities of Norway. The volume concludes with the symbols of 
Euroskepticism that are so closely tied to negative stereotypes of the EU. 
Across the boundaries of countries and disciplines one may recognize the 
questions, fears, and hopes for Europe in the 21st century. 
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Some Remarks on the Relationship between European 
Identity and the European Union 
Vladimir Gvozden 
She teases with those flashes, yes, but once
you yield to human horniness, you see
through all that moonshine what they really were,
those gods as seed-bulls, gods as rutting swans –  
an overheated farmhand’s literature (...) 
Nothing is there, just as it always was,
but the foam's wedge to the horizon-light, 
then, wire-thin, the studded armature,
like drops still quivering on his matted hide, 
the hooves and horn-points anagrammed in stars.
Derek Walcott, Europa (1981) 
“Europe” is a widely used synonym for the European Union even though many 
millions of Europeans live beyond the EU’s borders. Similarly, we sometimes 
call the United States of America simply “America.” The political, economic and 
military power of the United States and the European Union may not easily be 
compared, but the rhetoric of power and the underlying binary opposition of 
being inside or outside of the “Empire” are, at least as a metaphor, behind both 
of these names. When we speak of a European identity, we should consider that 
the phrase has at least two different meanings. It may mean a sense of 
personal identification with Europe and, more recently, with the European Union 
or European identity may be taken as an identity possessed by Europe as a 
whole in a wider, global context. The second meaning is particularly visible in 
periods of political and intercultural crises such as during the Jyllands-Posten 
Muhammad cartoons controversy in 2005. Although the cartoon was published 
in Danish newspapers, the protesting Palestinians evidently saw the cartoons as 
a European issue, more than people in Europe itself. 
What does it mean to be European? This seemingly simple question leads to 
further questions: What was the reason for the unification of Europe – 
pragmatism, utilitarian calculations, economic reasons, the fear or joy of 
globalization, cultural idealism? What is it that all European nations share? Is 
European identity the sum of national identities? Or is it a supplement to 
national identities? Is there really a “Euro-identity”? All of these questions are 
connected with the problem of the Other. Is the Other inside or outside Europe, 
or both inside and outside? Many different versions of European reality are 
visible, but they still do not form a unified whole. Whenever we discuss 
European identity, we must always consider whether people living in different 
countries differ in their acceptance and perception of the possible parallel 
existence of national and European identities. A. Maurits van der Veen 
maintains, “It is a well-established pattern that national populations differ in 
their support for the EU process.”1 They also differ in their perception of 
European identity and of Europe itself. 
In order to understand the nature and scope of Euroskepticism in Central, 
1 A. Maurits van der Veen, “Determinants of European Identity: A Preliminary Investigation 
Using Eurobarometer Data,” Conf. University of Pennsylvania, 19 Mar. 2002 
<http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/vanderveen.html>.
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Southern and Eastern Europe we must first consider two developments coming 
from Western countries themselves. The first is the intense promotion of the 
policies of the European Union. This is particularly visible in Eastern Europe, 
even more so than in Western Europe. The second is Western Europe’s criticism 
of this same European Union, criticism that is hardly registered in the less 
developed countries of Eastern Europe. I would emphasize that it is a mistake 
to view Euroskepticism in Eastern Europe as an isolated phenomenon. It should 
rather be seen as part of a more general skepticism that is tied to certain 
historical developments after WWII. Thus, the Euroskepticism that comes from 
Eastern European countries does not have the same powerful background and 
influence as the Euroskepticism in Great Britain, the Netherlands, or France. A 
good starting point for beginning our discussion is therefore the following 
question: To what extent is Euroskepticism present in the European Union 
itself, particularly among its older members? Necessary brevity does not allow 
for a broad discussion of Euroskepticism, instead attention will be given to the 
most important and crucial issues concerning a common European identity 
today.
The first Euroskeptic I met personally was the British author and anti-EU 
activist Rodney Atkinson, the brother of the more famous actor Rowan 
Atkinson, known better as Mr. Bean. He is one of the most radical Euroskeptics. 
He writes widely on the Nazi origin of the European Union, which he believes to 
have found in one of Goebbel’s lectures delivered during WWII. He thus 
especially attacks the role of Germany in EU-affairs. I met him in Serbia under 
Miloševiü’s rule in the mid-1990s. The British author maintained, as he had 
earlier written in his book European Full Circle, that the European Union 
represents a danger for democracy, freedom, free trade, and national identity. 
In short, the European Union should never have even come into being. His 
repertoire of criticism was quite impressive. At the time, I did not take his talk 
seriously, although I was surprised that the values I considered to be very 
important for a future, postMiloševiü Serbia could be attacked in this way. 
However, I have had cause to repeatedly reflect on his statements; I discovered 
Mr. Atkinson is not alone in his opinions, but rather shares them, at least in 
certain aspects, with British, Western, and Eastern European politicians. I am 
not someone who believes in utopias, and as such, I did not believe that all of 
Mr. Atkinson’s arguments are valid. However, he offered convincing reasons to 
support his criticism, and I could not always counter properly. Some of his ideas 
were, of course, quite extreme and unacceptable, especially when he asserted 
there is a connection between the EU and Nazi Germany and Goebbel’s ideas 
about the future of Europe. The European Union certainly does not exercise 
totalitarian policy, begin wars, or build concentration camps. Nonetheless, 
meeting so strong a Euroskeptic was a rather disturbing experience at that 
time, because I, as many other citizens of Serbia, considered the European 
Union to be an important political power that could help the country remove 
Miloševiü and establish a more prosperous and democratic society. Although 
Atkinson did not change my mind, his ideas did cast a different light on the 
European Union and caused me to reconsider my own understanding of it. At 
the very least, I had to think about the pros and cons of the European Union 
since the same or similar arguments could also appear in everyday discussion 
as well as in political discourse.
After reading Atkinson’s book, I realized that he is a proponent of strong 
economic, military and political cooperation between the United States and 
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Britain. He perceives NATO as an important factor for stability in Europe and 
worldwide. Some of Atkinson’s arguments against the European Union could, 
however, equally be applied to NATO, especially those arguments criticizing the 
loss of sovereignty and national identity. When I lived in Poland in 2001, I 
suddenly realized how important it was for Polish politicians to answer the 
following question: What is more valuable – membership in NATO or in the EU? 
I traveled to Dubrovnik this summer. While sailing into one of Dubrovnik’s ports 
on a yacht, I saw the following graffiti on a wall: EU=SFRJ (Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia). These Croatians see any kind of supranational political 
entity as the same evil as the former socialist Yugoslavia. A similar 
phenomenon may be noticed in other Eastern European countries. When the 
country is closer to membership in the European Union and people become 
more aware of the cost of this membership in the “club,” Euroskepticism arises. 
The idea behind the graffiti echoes the words of the Czech president Václav 
Klaus, who describes himself as a “Eurorealist”: “The enemies of free societies 
today are those who want to burden us again with layer upon layer of 
regulations. We had that in communist times. But now if you look at all the new 
rules and regulations of EU membership, layered bureaucracy is staging a 
comeback.” The EU’s 30,000 bureaucrats have indeed produced some 80,000 
pages of regulations that the Czech Republic and other European applicants for 
EU membership must adopt. However, if you ask me about the situation in 
Serbia after 2000, i.e. one decade after Miloševiü’s rule, I will answer that there 
is political consensus about the desirability of membership in the European 
Union, although there is neither readiness nor enough political resources to put 
theory into practice, especially not quickly. After Romania and Bulgaria became 
members of the EU at the beginning of 2007, every responsible Serbian 
politician had to ask himself what place his country should have in the world. 
Similarly, albeit with a different set of problems in mind, we can ask what place 
Europe should have in the world, in Germany, or in any other European 
country. How different can that place be in the case of Great Britain, Germany, 
France, Portugal, the Czech Republic, or Serbia? Global issues seem to unite 
Europe more than ever. However, this awareness about the role of Europe in 
the global economy and global politics is problematic. This article is an attempt 
to outline the problem of European identity that may not be resolved in a short 
history of the European Union. This shall neither be a criticism from a Serbian 
point of view, nor an expression of Euroskepticism or Eurorealism. This is rather 
an attempt to outline specific issues that unfortunately very often go without 
saying, obviously not in philosophical papers, juridical discussions or policy-
making, but in all-embracing public discourse.
Today’s problem of European identity seems to be a much more complex issue 
than it was thought to have been twenty or even ten years ago. The legitimacy 
of the institutions of the European Union leaves much to be desired. Of course, 
there are many research programs devoted to the study of European 
integration, identity, or freedom of movement that involve many disciplines. 
Despite these efforts, it is not clear enough whether European integration 
strengthens a sense of European identity and whether European identity has a 
strong impact on support for integration. Although the European Union has 
made some attempts to improve identification with “Europe” (i.e. the European 
Union) and introduced some well-known European symbols such as a flag and 
an anthem, early expectations that nation-states and their people would 
become more European and gradually abandon their national identity, have not 
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been met. The European Union is not seen as a nation, and patriotism 
comparable with that of nation-states may hardly be detected. 
From the beginning, the Union has been built on the assumption of a 
permanent diversity of national identities in Europe, the idea of unity in 
diversity. The institutions of the European Union always have focused more on 
European integration than on supporting the creation of a European identity. 
Moreover, at the beginning, the European Union derived legitimacy from being 
an instrument of national governments. But today, as Van der Veen points out, 
“with the growing impact of EU legislation on every aspect of national economic 
life, and the threat it poses to particular national institutional arrangements for 
fiscal and monetary politics, the welfare state, and even foreign policy, it has 
become clear to those publics that the European Union can no longer be viewed 
as an instrument, but instead had become a governing body in need of 
legitimacy independent from that it receives through national governments.”2
Europe advances quickly in regards to economic integration, but political or 
cultural integration comes much slower. The issue of the Union’s legitimacy 
becomes increasingly problematic and a growing number of analysts maintain 
that the progress of European integration will be impeded by the lack of a 
common identity. According to recent research, nations do not share as great a 
sense of community as many had hoped. 
1. The question of European identity traditionally touches on issues of 
historical, geographical, economic, political, legal, and cultural importance. 
However, when we seriously consider the possibility of a shared history of 
European people, we immediately see that European history is also the 
history of animosity and conflicts. Certainly some historical narratives in 
history textbooks could hardly be considered a bonding experience (look at 
the treatment of Napoleon, for example). Although many analysts consider 
that history can therefore not be a basis for European identity, others 
argue that it not only could but it actually is one of the most important 
impulses for integration. In fact, that was the leading idea of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (1951), the forerunner of the European 
Community. Steel was essential in the production or armaments in World 
War II and was a fundamental resource of the Western European states. 
The project was intended to promote cooperation and reconciliation 
between France and Germany in the aftermath of the war. In a similar 
fashion, this could be a crucial political argument for integrating countries 
of the Western Balkans into the European Union.
2. Many authors postulate a common culture as a key part of European 
identity. They point to ancient Greece, ancient Rome, the feudalism of the 
Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, national 
liberalism of the nineteenth century, and also the negative elements such 
as colonialism, civil wars, and the world wars. However, it is hard to prove 
that this is a common culture. One may not only recognize shared culture, 
but also many cultural differences between European countries and in each 
country itself. Many elements of this proposed European cultural identity 
are elements of the West in general, so they cannot be considered 
exclusively European.
3. The debate over the role of Christianity in Europe best exemplifies the 
2 Veen 13. 
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issue of cultural differences. The role of Christianity was undoubtedly 
important for the history and identity of Europe in the past, but it is 
perhaps the most controversial element of an assumed common heritage 
today. Pope Benedict XVI clearly emphasized in his lecture “Faith, Reason 
and the University – Memories and Reflections” in Regensburg in 2006 
both the European nature of Christianity and the Christian nature of 
Europe: “It is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some 
significant developments in the East, finally took on a historically decisive 
character in Europe. We can also express this in another way: this 
convergence and the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage created 
Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.”3
However, the European convention rejected a reference to Christianity 
and/or God in the proposed European Constitution. In an attempt to 
integrate members of political communities, citizenship has always been 
based on exclusion, by defining clearly who are and who are not citizens. 
The policy-makers from most European countries were afraid that if they 
included Christianity in the European Constitution, they would produce the 
Other inside Europe’s borders and make integration even slower and more 
problematic.
4. Besides history and culture, there is also the idea that a shared language 
(or languages) might help overcome some of problems of European 
identity. Some authors have suggested that in the not too distant future 
citizens of European countries will learn a regional language, a national 
language (if different) and English. However, we can agree with Van der 
Veen when he says, “language, too, can be argued to be shared both too 
broadly . . . and not broadly enough."4 For example, how many Europeans 
will learn Polish or Bulgarian? Similarly, the citizens of many former British 
colonies speak English, and so it can obviously not be the mark of a 
separate European identity.
5. European integration itself has an influence on European identity. For 
example, the free movement of people across European borders has 
increased due to the Schengen Accords of 1985 and 1990. The European 
Union has also been sponsoring a program of university exchanges for 
many years, the Erasmus program, which allows European university 
students study a semester abroad at a university in another member 
state. Over the last 18 years, Erasmus has made it possible for 1.2 million 
students to study at another university in Europe. That is likely the best 
argument many policy-makers in the European Union give when reacting 
to criticisms of the lack of attempts to foster common European identity. 
There is a feeling that beyond politics and institutional battles, the 
everyday reality of Europe's open borders is quietly forging a European 
identity.5 A growing number of young Europeans study, work and date 
across the continent – but they also do that in the United States, which 
usually makes policy-makers worried about the success of European 
educational programs. Many believe that new generations are more 
multilingual and multicultural than the generations of their parents. 
3 Pope Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections,” 
Lecture of the Holy Father, Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg, 12 Sept. 2006. 
4 Veen 4. 
5 See Katrin Bennhold, “Quietly sprouting: A European identity,” International Herald 
Tribune 26 Apr. 2005 <http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/04/26/news/enlarge2.php>. 
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According to a survey by Time magazine, almost a third of those surveyed 
between age 21 to 35 say they feel more European than German, French, 
or Italian. However, it is necessary to take such claims with caution. We 
should remember that the term “nation” was once used at mediaeval 
universities, above all at the University of Paris, to describe colleagues in a 
college or students, who were all born within a pays, spoke the same 
language, and who expected to be ruled by their own familiar law. The 
division of students into nations was also adopted at the University of 
Prague, where from its opening in 1349 the studium generale was divided 
among Bohemian, Bavarian, Saxon and various Polish nations.
6. It is often felt that a common European identity could be promoted by the 
same compulsory educational systems that previously served the building 
of national identities. However, some of these attempts proved to be 
rather unsuccessful. For example, in 1997 the European Commission 
distributed a comic entitled The Raspberry Ice Cream War: a Comic for 
Young People on a Peaceful Europe without Frontiers and aimed at children 
in schools. The EU office in London immediately declined to distribute it in 
the UK due to an expected unsympathetic reception of the book’s 
description of borders in Europe as “mediaeval.” Britain had not, after all, 
signed the Schengen Agreement. Critics say that the problem in all the 
picture books and in much of the European Union's attempts at connecting 
with the public is that the EU confuses information with propaganda.
 For the purpose of our discussion, I looked at a new brochure, Let’s 
explore Europe, intended for children roughly 9 to 12 years old and issued 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Press and 
Communication in 2005. I was surprised by two things. Participants of the 
war in South-Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslav republics, Serbia as well 
as Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia were not treated as part of Europe: 
“But in the last 50 years or so, the countries of this old continent have at 
last been coming together in peace, friendship and unity, to work for a 
better Europe and a better world.” I am aware that it is of crucial 
importance to teach children about the bloody and absurd war at the 
periphery of Europe, but I am still not quite sure that the Balkans are not 
part of Europe, especially after Romania and Bulgaria became members of 
the European Union on January 1, 2007. At least 15 million people live in 
the region and, with only minor exceptions, they all believe they live in 
Europe. Clearly, the misconception that members of the European Union 
are Europe is behind this interpretation.
 The thing that surprised me much more was the fact that the authors 
completely avoid mentioning the well-known word “philosophy” while 
exploring Europe. I can make a reasonable assumption about their 
educational and pedagogical motives, but I think these reasons are not 
legitimate. For whom is philosophy so complex that it must be censored? I 
do not see any reason why children in the European Union should learn 
that Aristotle was a philosopher and not a scientist as the authors labeled 
him in their textbooks. This is a false representation of history; even the 
term “scientist” is modern and not used by the Greeks. Besides that, 
philosophy, at least under that name, is the invention of ancient Greeks 
and could be considered a crucial constituent of European identity. One 
might conclude that philosophy is an unimportant element for forging the 
new consumerist subjects of a Europe Ltd. under the slogan: Forget
philosophy, let’s explore Europe! I still prefer to think this is merely a 
14
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mistake. The answer to the question of European identity as unitas
multiplex, if an answer is possible, can only come from a philosophical way 
of thinking. 
7. We should also think about the relevance of the “Idea of Europe” in the 
context of a multicultural and multi-ethnic continent that increasingly 
draws on the presence and practices of people from non-European 
backgrounds. The idea of Europe, even in its contemporary use, remains 
an ideal based on a heritage of Christianity, the Enlightenment, and 
Romanticism that supporters of European integration created as the bridge 
between diverse European national cultures. In a Europe of extraordinary 
cultural interchange and immigration from all corners of the world, this 
classical view on Europe is strikingly exclusionary and backward looking – 
a poor motif for the future, especially if compared to those of the United 
States and Canada. Would it not be better to look at Europe, as Amin Ash 
proposed, as a migrant space, rather than one based on the enduring 
cultural values of a body of people called Europeans? 6
8. The concept of European identity is more problematic today, when it is 
fashionable to speak of so-called multiple identities. According to many 
contemporary theoretical proposals, identities are not easily separable. 
Different feelings of affinity – ethnic or national group, gender, profession, 
and politics intersect and overlap in the many contexts of everyday life. 
There is no linguistic or cultural homogeneity even on a national level. A 
common European identity can neither be based on Christianity (because 
of its failure to integrate atheists, Muslims and Jews), nor on economic 
identity (economies are still very different on national levels), nor on 
ethnic identity (there are even more ethnic groups than states), nor by 
presenting history to children in a pseudo-Marxist way as (all dubiously 
chosen aspects of) a history leading to the present state of the European 
Union. A genuine European identity, which will be conducive to the 
integration of its citizens, will not arise from impossible cultural uniformity. 
Since no European cultural nationalism could be developed, there is a need 
for a non-national conception of political loyalty, a minimal common 
denominator to help many European countries develop a post-national 
political community. As it was historically, European identity is not a 
matter of the past or the present, but of the future; the matter of 
becoming, not of being. The fundamental question that needs to be asked 
is: what is going to unite the people of Europe in the future? Some authors 
have stressed that common values should be protected by appropriate EU-
level rights that can both support and bind cultural pluralism and 
difference. They propose democratic vitalism as Europe's core political 
project, an idea of becoming European, read as the process of never-
settled cultural invention which results from the vibrant clashes of an 
equal and empowered multiple public. As one author says, “No myth of 
origin, no myth of destination, only the commitment to a plural demos." 
You do not have to be a sociologist to provide the answer: shared values. 
This answer, however, reveals the essence of the problem that is once 
again confronting the European Union and its citizens. 
9. Finally, some analysts note a lack of citizen participation and speak of a 
6 Amin Ash, “Multiethnicity and the idea of Europe,” Theory, Culture and Society 21(2): 1-
24. 
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democratic deficit in the European Union. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas proposed an alternative 
foundation for political loyalty towards the EU, European constitutional 
patriotism. This idea is a key part in theories of post-nationalism and has 
been influential in the development of the European Union. Habermas 
popularized the term Verfassungspatriotism, coined by the political theorist 
Dolf Sternberger in the 1970s. According to the principle of constitutional 
patriotism, citizenship should be based on a shared sense of values rather 
than a common history or ethnic origin. Unlike a national or regional 
identity, strongly related to geography and language, for most people 
being European appears to be a set of shared values. One such value 
would be democracy, which, according to periodic opinion polls conducted 
by the Commission, most Europeans associate with a social safety net. 
Quality of life ranks high on their list of priorities, as do environmental 
concerns and a reluctance to use military means to achieve political goals. 
For Habermas, constitutional patriots orient their political action with 
reference to constitutions that have two central features: The constitutions 
plainly fall within a class of recognizably liberal constitutions and are the 
constitutions of and for a historically specific people and nation. The first of 
these features picks up on the attractive components of liberal 
universalism. The second limits the move upwards to a common humanity. 
The second feature picks up on the positive features of post-modernism, 
the first limits the move downwards to more local identities.
 There is, nonetheless, significant doubt whether the radically universalistic 
option or the inspiration of constitutional patriotism can serve as an 
identity-shaping force that has both moral legitimacy as well as historical 
plausibility. This model requires a historical self-understanding of the 
nation to support a liberal political culture. Furthermore, such 
constitutional patriotism is based on Habermas’s idea of legal persons. He 
thinks that legal persons should not be imagined as individual atoms; each 
person must be respected both as an individual as well as in the context of 
the cultural life-world. The three well-known objections to constitutional 
patriotism can be formulated as follows: first, there is the claim that 
constitutional patriotism is in fact a form of “state nationalism,” which 
ultimately tends to replicate the problems commonly associated with 
nationalism. Second, while constitutional patriotism is not necessarily a 
variety of nationalism, it is – and this might be normatively and practically 
even worse – a form of “civil religion.” Third, some object that 
constitutional patriotism is somehow “modernist” in the kind of moral 
psychology which it requires of citizens, and that such a modernist moral 
psychology is sociologically and normatively inappropriate for a post-
modern age of multiple, fluid, overlapping, ever-evolving identities.
Obviously, “it is difficult to know how to engineer affection for a new European 
patria . . . ”, but “the Union cannot just hope and pray that the identity and 
democracy problems will somehow go away.”7 If Europe does not want to be an 
empty myth in global politics, as in one possible reading of our motto from 
Derek Walcott’s poem “Europa,” then it must act as a space of common values 
and their recognition. We may, however, freely ask whether we need common 
values in today’s consumerist culture. Modern European unity started – and 
7 Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International 
Politics (London: Macmillan, 1998) 224. 
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owes everything – to its focus on well-being, power, and security; to its 
economic integration and the welfare this secured for the European member 
states. Can we unreservedly say that the post-modern, post-ideological, post-
Christian, global society without permanent values has made a major 
contribution to insure respect for everyone’s individual freedoms, tolerance, and 
peace? In most developed states, we also note separatist and nationalist 
tendencies, the rise of terrorism, social disintegration and increasing pointless 
violence, corruption, political self-interest, lack of values, and the decline of 
standards. Are these developments peripheral phenomena of modern society or 
signs of a more fundamental crisis and if so, what consequences do they have 
for promoting European unity? Do politics and economics have a response to 
this moral crisis or are they contributing to it? What are the causes of this crisis 
in European values? How relevant are these values to Europe’s heritage? Can 
any kind of universalism still exist in an era marked by individualism and 
cultural relativism? 
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Euroskepticism in Slovakia 
Andrej Nosko 
Translation Kenneth Hanshew 
Euroskepticism may be viewed as a specific form of politics that exists in 
addition to economic, philosophical or other various political programs in 
Europe.1 Euroskepticism is one extreme in the spectrum of views regarding 
European integration and the European Union as it is. In Central Europe in 
general and in Slovakia in particular, it was and continues to be part of an 
alternative populist political program that stylizes itself as the protector of 
national identity or sovereignty in order to detract from real social problems. 
As a result of Euroskepticism’s convergence with a political position that 
opposes reform, Euroskepticism and its proponents have both found and 
continue to find adherents mostly among those who have benefited the least 
and lost the most during transition. This part of the population is older, less 
educated and found in rural areas.2 Euroskepticism may not, however, be 
simply considered to be part of an existing economic borderline between the 
haves and have-nots.3 Central European Euroskepticism must rather be seen as 
a political program opposed to a free market. It includes anti-progressive views 
as a result of differing opinions on how a country should proceed in its 
transition from a totalitarian past.4
It is not the intention of the author to offer a theoretical analysis of 
Euroskepticism or to analyze the complexities of Euroskepticism in Central 
Europe. The subject of the following text is rather the development of 
Euroskepticism in Slovakia in the context of its domestic politics. The first part 
explores the specifics of this political phenomenon in Slovakia. The second part 
briefly summarizes Euroskepticism’s development in Slovak politics. The
1 Poltical lines are largely specific to a certain context and depend on the particularities of 
a political community. The most frequent boundary lines in Europe are those between 
urban and rural, economic left and right, between a conservative and liberal perspective.  
2 Karen Henderson, “Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the 
Slovak Republic,” SEI Working Paper No 50 [Opposing Europe Research Network Paper 
No 5] Sussex European Institute, 2001. 
3 Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “‘Parties, Positions and Europe’: Euroscepticism in the 
EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe,” Annual Conference of the Political 
Studies Association, Manchester, 10-12 Apr. 2001. 
4 See also Herbert Kitschelt, “The Formation of Party Systems in East Central Europe,” 
Politics and Society 20.1 (1992): 20. 
One must view Slovak Euroskepticism in the context of European integration to 
understand it. Slovakia perceived European integration as a return to Europe, a 
return to its legitimate place on the world geostrategical map, and a return to 
where (Czecho-) Slovakia certainly would have been before had a communist 
totalitarian government not been established. It is necessary to add that the 
majority of the population viewed the integration into European structures and 
NATO as an organic whole. It is therefore possible in most cases, at least until 
Slovakia joined the European Union (EU), to speak of European-Atlantic 
integration.
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It is useful to view Slovak Euroskepticism in three stages in order to evaluate it 
and its development in both regional and national politics. Perhaps the most 
important factor in the first phase, which was significant for Slovakia’s future 
development, was the actions of the coalition comprised of the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), the Slovak National Party (SNS), and the 
Association of Workers in Slovakia (ZRS) in Meþiar’s third government. In the 
second period, which may be characterized as an attempt to board a departing 
train, the most important factor is the rule of premier Dzurinda’s coalition 
government at least in its first and the first part of its second term. 
Widespread support for European-Atlantic integration emerged during this time. 
Expressions of Euroskepticism were both few and sporadic and incapable of 
explicitly calling the integration process into question. Euroskepticism was 
rather an attempt to create a unique political profile that differed from the 
largely held consensus on integration by speaking to an extreme (and 
marginalized) part of the population. In light of its danger for the country’s real 
membership in the EU, only parties without real political responsibility, the 
opposition parties Direction (SMER), the SNS, and to a certain extent the HZDS, 
could indulge in this strategy. 
The third phase, which continues to the present, began with Slovakia’s 
membership in the EU and Fico’s government. It is characterized by a 
normalization of political struggles, partial standardization of political questions 
and an absence of revolutionary questions regarding the Slovak nation in 
national politics.
Meþiar’s optimism 
The beginning of Euroskepticism may be dated simplistically with the beginning 
of contacts with European institutions. A public debate neither preceded the 
decision to sign associative agreements with the EU nor the application for full 
membership. The lack of discussion may be seen as the result of the general 
perception that the European-Atlantic process of integration was a natural 
development, Slovakia’s return to its legitimate historical place from which it 
had unfortunately been separated. 
It may seem that Slovakia’s political elite fully supported European integration 
in the period from October 1993, when the agreement of association was 
signed, until October 1997, when the EU did not include Slovakia among the 
possible new candidates for membership, because it had not fulfilled the 
political requirements of the Copenhagen Agreement. Early Slovak support for 
integration was, however, merely in word and not of substance. 
Meþiar’s third government was temporarily excluded from European-Atlantic 
integration due to its marked deficits and disregard for law and democratic 
principles. The EU reacted foremost to the unsettling developments in Slovakia 
regarding human rights, democracy, and general national politics (the 
relationship to Hungary and ethnic minorities, the kidnapping of the president’s 
son, and the failed referendum on the direct election of the president). 
One may view the outcome of the summit in Madrid, where Slovakia’s 
application for membership in NATO was rejected, as the greatest defeat for 
Slovak foreign policy. It is necessary to emphasize that NATO membership was 
understood as the first step on the path towards Europe. The rejection of
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Slovakia’s application for membership in NATO was therefore a clear signal that 
the politics of demarches with the EU was not simply a game and 
discouragement as the premier had suggested. It had, in fact, become a real 
detriment to the European-Atlantic integration of Slovakia.
At the time, the ruling political elite was counting on an extraordinary position 
and an illusory alternative future for Slovakia as a bridge between European-
Atlantic institutions and Europe. Meþiar’s declaration “if they don’t want us in 
the West, then we’ll turn to the East”5 most clearly shows the idea of an 
alternative, equal path for Slovakia. This was embraced most of all by those 
suffering from the effects of reforms and the transition to democracy, 
conditions which led to Slovak Euroskepticism.
Although the ostracism of Slovakia under Meþiar is not directly related to 
Euroskepticism in this period, it does influence national politics and 
Euroskepticism in the following period. 
Catching the missed train and Euroskepticism 
The parliamentary elections in the fall of 1998 were a turning point for the 
growth of democracy in independent Slovakia. Thanks to an unprecedented 
mobilization of the civic sector and a high voter turnout (84,24%), the 
government coalition under Mikuláš Dzurinda received a mandate to jump on 
the train of European-Atlantic integration.
In this atmosphere it was impossible to have any doubts about the European-
Atlantic orientation of the country. Thus, Euroskepticism or any type of criticism 
or questioning of integration became a general social taboo. Peter Schutz 
described the situation in the year 2000 as follows: “in Slovakia the 
nonstandard political system prohibits even the tiniest bit of critical discussion 
of the touchy theme ‘Europe.’ Supporters of the EU glorify Brussels and engage 
in self-censorship to the point of political correctness while on the other 
extreme ‘Euroskeptics’ like Malikovej6 or the HZDS try to stir up fears.”7 In this 
context, any real discussion of possible disadvantages to membership in the EU 
was impossible. The only critical, albeit discredited voices, came from the 
opposition, which attempted to make easy political gains by proclaiming 
populist goals without any real political responsibility. 
František Gyarfáš notes in his remark two years after the elections that 
intellectuals played a specific part in Euroskeptical profiling: 
Slovak Euroskepticism is almost ornamental rather than substantial. They 
don’t demand that we don’t join the EU. The Euroskepticism of Slovak 
intellectuals is a position full of agreement. The arguments of our 
5 The citation is ascribed to Meþiar. See both Daniel Bútora, “Turecký pochod,” TýždeĖ
<http://www.tyzden.sk/sk/spolocnost/article52.php> and Alexander Duleba cited in 
“Zomrel prvý ruský president,” SME <http://www.sme.sk/c/3261546/Zomrel-prvy-
rusky-prezident.html>.  
6 At this time head of the SNS. 
7 Domino Forum, 21-26 Sept. 2000. 
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Euroskeptics usually sound this way: Yes, we want our country to join the 
EU, but...8
One might expect a certain reservation or mild Euroskepticism in the Christian 
Democratic Party as a result of its right-wing conservative character. However, 
due to the situation in Slovakia, it decided to support joining the EU and 
encouraged its supporters to not only participate in the referendum but also to 
vote for membership in the EU. 
Meþiar’s HZDS, Sloto and Malik’s SNS, and from 1999 on Fico’s SMER 
represented forgotten opposition parties and nongovernmental opposition. The 
SNS adopted a revisionist position when it declared, “the SNS was never 
opposed to Slovakia’s membership in the EU and will respect the people’s will 
as expressed in the referendum regarding this question.”9 This declaration 
contrasts with the SNS’s frequent public appeals for neutrality that most clearly 
characterized the party’s foreign policy. 
The position of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) remained ambiguous. 
Although it also could have profiled itself with this theme, the discredited HZDS 
did not respond to an email request to explain its position at the time. It is 
possible, however, to consider the party to be populist with mere verbal 
attempts at integration in the form of declarations, while it in fact remained 
opposed to reforms as in its past history of governing. 
Róbert Fico’s populist group stylized itself in election campaigns as the defender 
of national interests and expressed the desire to reopen previously negotiated 
agreements (and thus endanger Slovakia’s pending membership in the EU). In 
a last ditch effort, the group attempted to make political gains by exploiting the 
poorly informed public. It criticized the outcome of the talks on membership for 
Slovakia and resorted to vulgar campaign billboards.10 It was above all Fico’s 
party SMER that attempted to win politically by pointing out the temporary 
disadvantages to membership in the EU. 
Thanks to its successful foreign policy, the general feeling that reforms were 
necessary, and a little luck, Dzurinda was able to form a second government 
that successfully completed the process of integrating the Slovak Republic into 
NATO and the EU. 
The discourse before the referendum on joining the EU is certainly worth 
studying. Slovakia’s political elite knew that up until that time not a single valid 
referendum had been held in Slovakia. The greatest risk was not reaching the 
minimum required voter participation due to the citizens distrusting this 
democratic form – a result of their previous experience with an unsuccessful 
referendum – or due to the political elite’s talk of alternatives should the 
referendum fail. The elite had unanimously proposed to enact a law so that 
membership could be accepted by parliament in case the referendum was 
invalid. These statements increased voters’ alienation from politics and the 
general disinterest in politics, which may be seen in the level of voter 
participation that fell in parliamentary elections from 84.2% in 1998 to 54.7% 
8 František Gyarfáš, “‘Áno, ale ...’ slovenských euroskeptikov,” 8 Aug. 2000 
<http://www.inzine.sk/article.asp?art=3853>.  
9 From an email from sekretariat1@sns.sk 4 Feb. 2003 at 13:24. 
10 Perhaps the most ‘memorable’ billboard is the one from SMER showing several bare 
bottoms in reference to Slovakia’s economic development at the time of entering the EU. 
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in 2006. The increasing disinterest in politics may be seen even more clearly in 
the elections for higher regional offices (VUC) (26% in 2001 18% in 2005).
Despite an unprecedented media campaign and mobilization of voters, the 
referendum on joining the EU was barely valid. Voter participation was 52.15%. 
The government spent a significant amount on the campaign to not only 
improve voter turnout but also to expressly increase the number of votes for 
the EU. This was occasionally, but only infrequently criticized. Only 17% of 
eligible voters cast a ballot in the elections for the European Parliament. This 
may be viewed as disinterest in European politics, lack of information, and as a 
result of the elections closely following presidential elections. 
Apart from the success in foreign policy and the country’s extraordinary gain of 
credibility internationally, Dzurinda also succeeded in improving Slovakia’s 
economy and making Slovakia an attractive place for investors in Central 
Europe thanks to radical economic reforms and above all a reform of the tax 
system.
Reforms, which had often been undertaken and been supported because they 
had been perceived as a precondition for membership in the EU or a 
requirement from Brussels (despite the fact that they often exceeded the 
requirements), led to faster economic development. This began to become 
visible at the same time Slovakia entered the EU and completely took the wind 
out of the sails of potential Euroskeptics while at the same time paving the way 
for the creation of current Euroskepticism in Slovakia. 
Slovak Euroskepticism after joining the EU 
To a certain degree, political agendas returned to normal after Slovakia joined 
the EU. The absence of significant questions of state such as direct negative 
consequences of EU-membership, of which the opposition parties had so often 
warned, as well as the change from a political agenda to questions of economic 
and social reforms directly influenced Slovak Euroskepticism. 
Slovaks did not perceive the country’s joining the EU as something negative. 
23
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The freedom to travel and work in the countries that had opened their borders 
(above all the UK and Ireland) in addition to the positive growth of the domestic 
economy insured the Slovaks support for membership in the EU. 
The measurable improvement in living standards, a result of reforms and EU 
membership, led to a new form of Slovak Euroskepticism, which was expressed 
primarily by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). It uncompromisingly 
attempted to have Europe’s Christian heritage mentioned in the European 
constitution and to restrict possible European laws allowing same sex 
marriages, reproductive rights, and, above all, abortion. Thanks to the words of 
its minister of finance, the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU) stood 
out by opposing EU attempts to harmonize the tax system, which is perceived 
in Slovakia as an important motor for new economic growth. Recently, 
Euroskepticism founded on differences or a perception of the Slovak way as 
exemplary, an interpretation Slovakia’s economic growth supports, have given 
way to Fico’s attempts to win trust internationally by presenting his policies as a 
modern European variant of European social policy. This influenced Slovak 
Euroskepticism during the last parliamentary elections in a specific way. 
Slovak Euroskepticism since 2006 
At the beginning, both the opposition as well as the EU severely criticized the 
coalition government under Róbert Fico due to its make-up of SMER, the 
People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ďS-HZDS), and the SNS. 
In reaction to the coalition with the nationalist SNS, European socialists 
suspended the membership of Fico’s political party. Foreign investors and other 
partners feared new destructive politics in Slovakia due to initial inept and 
undiplomatic statements. 
As a result of severe criticism, the necessity to preserve at least a minimum of 
respect in international politics, and the pledge to enter the European Common 
Currency Union, premier Fico toned down the rhetoric and silenced Jan Slota, 
the chairman of the SNS, his coalition partner. 
During this period it is possible to characterize Euroskepticism as having two 
forms. The first is reflected in the present governing coalition and is populist. 
The coalition attempts to forecast public opinion and react to it in order to profit 
politically. This form is at the same time limited by the responsibility to govern 
the country, to plan foreign policy and to continue European integration in the 
form of the Schengen system and a monetary union. Euroskepticism may 
hardly be combined with a strategy of intensive European integration. Thus, 
any attempt to do so is pure populism. This is the reason why Slovak foreign 
policy appears two-faced. Politicians of the governing coalition present radically 
different views at home and abroad.11 One example is premier Fico’s address 
concerning the European constitution: “I don’t think that this topic interests 
anyone. They’re making a big deal out of it as if it were the most interesting 
thing in the world.”12 This statement had to be corrected many times by the 
foreign minister Kubiš. 
11 Examples are the discussion of a European constitution or the building of American bases 
in the region as a part of a radar array. 
12 Róbert Fico cited on 11 Jun. 2007 
<http://aktualne.centrum.sk/zahranicie/europa/clanek.phtml?id=239352>. 
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The second form of current Euroskepticism may be considered to be intellectual 
idealism or economics. It is sometimes present in the statements of the current 
opposition, most frequently coming from the KDH and concerning the 
conservative defense of Christian values and attempts to maintain an 
independent tax system. As in the former cases, it is necessary to note that 
these are attempts to improve the party’s visibility without real political impact.
Conclusion
Euroskepticism is in general a relatively weak political phenomenon in Slovakia. 
With the exception of occasional Euroskeptical statements or parts of political 
agendas that may be considered Euroskeptical, there is no Slovak political party 
that explicitly defines itself as Euroskeptical. The most Euroskeptical party is 
either the nationalist SNS or the conservative KDH. This is a result of the 
relatively non-consolidated political system, the all too dominant topic of nation 
building in the preceding period, and the messianic attempt to return to Europe, 
which superseded everyday politics. 
One may expect that European topics will continue to be absent in national 
politics in the future and, as in the case of joining the EU, one may also 
anticipate a lack of public debate before joining the monetary union. 
Euroskeptical moods may appear during attempts to harmonize social and tax 
systems on the level of the EU or in regards to cultural politics or minority 
rights (especially during the current coalition government). In the long run, it is 
unlikely that Euroskepticism will have more relevance as a political 
phenomenon than it does today. It will continue to be more appropriate to 
analyze domestic politics in Slovakia according to social, economic and 
ideological lines as long as Eurooptimistic-Euroskeptic lines do not reach a 
sufficient level of political homogeneity and duration. 
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"Europeanism" Czech-style 
Kenneth Hanshew 
The publication of Václav Klaus’ essay “Co je to evropeismus?” [What is 
Europeanism?] on April 8, 2006, in Mladá fronta dnes, at the time the most 
widely read newspaper in the Czech Republic, shows not only how important 
such basic terms are but also that they themselves are grounds for heated 
debate.1 By choosing the foreign term evropeismus over the Czech evropanství,
the title differentiates between a European political program and a more 
general European cultural identity in a way that is not possible in most 
languages. In his two-page essay, Klaus thus addresses Europeanism as the 
opposite to national politics. Klaus views Europeanism as an authoritarian 
“metaideology” that brings together diverse political groups, ranging from social 
democrats, Christian democrats to even communists, in the name of Europe, 
although these groups do not share similar views. He then identifies five 
aspects of Europeanism: economic policy, a policy of integration, a particular 
way of understanding freedoms and democracy, foreign policy, and a general 
Europeanist philosophy. Klaus argues, that Europeanism does not accept Adam 
Smith’s economic theories of a self-regulating market, but rather believes in a 
state run command economy that will control the “anarchy” of the economic 
market. In his second point, Klaus criticizes Europeanist integration for not 
being an attempt to eliminate all unnecessary trade barriers or restrictions on 
the freedom of movement of people and capital. Reforms should instead be 
undertaken as a result of the natural competition between EU-member 
countries. Klaus contends that Europeanism is an interventionist model of 
government. It intends to centralize, regulate, and harmonize all “parameters” 
of political, economic and social systems; to standardize the conditions of 
production and consumption; and to homogenize human life. Everything is 
In the first article, Vladimir Gvozden muses on the endeavor to more closely 
integrate the nations of Europe and questions the attempts to find some 
common basis to either form a distinct European identity or to prove the 
necessity of the European Union. His article reflects the multiple facets of 
thought regarding modern Europe. In discussions of the European Union and 
European identity, these thoughts are frequently referred to as “Europeanism.” 
It comes as no surprise that this term itself should be openly questioned in the 
Czech Republic, in the former lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, where 
language played a predominant role in creating a specific national identity. 
While supporters define the merits of Europeanism, critics in the Czech Republic 
argue that Europeanism is simply another word in the EU’s vocabulary of 
“Eurospeak,” which everyone uses, but no one understands. The meaning of 
such terms is not simply questioned in arcane academic journals with very few 
readers, but is also discussed in mainstream publications. The debate is not 
only interesting from a linguistic point of view. It is central to understanding the 
two overlapping streams of Czech Euroskepticism: the “anti-European,” which 
denies any cultural basis for a common Europe, and the criticism of the 
European Union’s policies. 
27
1 Václav Klaus, “Co je to evropeismus,” Mladá fronta dnes 8 Apr. 2006 D8 and 
<http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=KyyL9Tbap6Vd>.
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orchestrated from above with the aim to create supra-nationalism. In his third 
point, he maintains Europeanism is a post-democratic institution that strives to 
forge an alliance between nongovernmental agencies and to erode older 
European cultural foundations by accepting all progressive, new, nontraditional 
and anti-conservative movements from feminism to multiculturalism. 
Europeanists seek to govern as a corporation without the direct control of its 
citizens. Klaus condemns any European foreign policy as an attempt to destroy 
the nation state and its democratic political system, essentially a “brave new 
world in the order of Huxley which will offer rosy hours but neither freedom nor 
democracy,” the idea of a Europe of regions living in a post-governmental 
Nirvana as a homage to Lenin. He considers all discussion of a common 
European identity, European people, or “collective psyche of Europe” to be a 
mere tool for reaching this goal. Lastly, Klaus defines Europeanism as a new 
naive romantic utopian idea that is not based on human action but on human 
design. He concludes that Europeanism is the product of an elite, nonproductive 
minority – like Huxley’s Alpha-type figures – that has succeeded in presenting 
itself as the new, progressive future and all else as backward. They argue the 
plan is superior to the uncontrolled free action of citizens. Europeanism is – in 
Klaus’ words – “a revolutionary inversion of normality.”
In his essay, Klaus certainly does not offer any groundbreaking change from his 
position in 2001, when he professed Europeanism was a new type of religion 
that Joschka Fischer was preaching.2 However, he expands on this with a 
remarkable rhetorical strategy to attack and discredit the policies of the EU's 
Europeanism. He compares the realities and plans of the EU with the fictive 
worlds of authors of literary dystopias (Orwell and Huxley), alludes to tragic 
parallels in Czech history, and drops the words revolution, a planned economy, 
and even Lenin to invoke the specter of the not too distant socialist-totalitarian 
past. The connections he makes between the EU’s ideology and socialism here 
contradict his “démenti number 23,” published on October 3, 2007. In response 
to an interview in Lidové noviny, Klaus states, “I never have compared 
communist ideology to the ideology of the EU. . . . I do consider Europeanism 
to endanger freedom and democracy, but I never compared it to communism.”3
This strategy of comparison even appears in a seemingly harmless review of 
the Czech edition of Gordon Bowker’s biography of George Orwell in Lidové
noviny on Dec. 23, 2006. It ends with the statement that: 
Although Bowker did not bring Orwell back to life, he did show us his 
greatness and relevance that has in no way decreased since the fall of 
communism. Today’s Europeanism, which is restricting individual 
freedoms and reducing individuals’ responsibilities, deserves a new Orwell, 
or at least he is needed by those whom the old Orwell is unable to help to 
see post-democracy, political correctness, arrogance, and the 
manipulations of words and language.4
While an essay or a book review may seem to be a forum for a rational 
discussion, Klaus clearly tries to profit from readers’ fears and makes use of 
2 Václav Klaus, Interview with BBC, 11 Dec. 2001 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/czech/interview/klaus4.htm>.
3 Václav Klaus, “Co Klaus neĜekl, tentokráte o komunismu a Evropské unii – dementi þ.
23,” 3 Oct. 2007 <http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=fYHf7TAOOLjT>.  
4 Václav Klaus, “ýekání na Orwella,” Lidové noviny 23 Dec. 2006 
<http://neviditelnypes.lidovky.cz/p_kultura.aspc=A061225_095016_p_kultura_wag>. 
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common stereotypes. 
Many refuted Klaus’ long essay. Pavel Palíšek answered polemically in Mladá
fronta dnes that Klaus expands on his previous notions without offering any real 
arguments or facts.5 He concludes that politicians at the national level do not 
differ so much from European bureaucrats - Klaus also frequents five star hotels 
while traveling - and Klaus naively places just as much faith in the power of a 
free market as others place in the EU’s plan. This criticism of Klaus’ own 
ideology can be found almost a year later in an edition of Britské listy. OndĜej
Rut notes that Klaus seeks to define Europeanism, all “isms,” in Marxist terms, 
as an ideology of a specific society; however, Klaus himself only offers a 
competing ideology.6 David Klimeš echoes Palíšek’s second point in his 
response entitled “Klaus: propagator of isms without content.”7 Klimeš notes 
that laissez-faireism is also an ideology with its own problems when it comes to 
implementation and questions Klaus’ faith in political parties over NGOs. He 
concludes that Klaus’ essay shows he should have joined Václav Havel a long 
time ago, i.e., he should retire from politics. Despite his scalding criticism, 
Klimeš believes Klaus plays a positive role. He applauds Klaus for being the first 
to openly criticize the “kidnapping of the Czech Republic from Moscow to 
Brussels,” to question the vague socialist vision for Europe and to disrupt the 
discourse of power. In “Klaus’ questioning of Europeanism,” Bohumil Doležal 
agrees with Klaus’ detailed criticism of many ideas and movements that have 
seized Europe, but notes that his essay simply rehashes his standard ideas.8
Doležal correctly remarks that any mention of an attack on national sovereignty 
plays well with a Czech public due its history of being ruled and longing for 
freedom; however, Klaus never does determine what a nation-state is. In the 
end, Doležal’s most striking opinion is that while it is true that Czech heads of 
state, beginning with Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk and continuing through Eduard 
Beneš, Václav Havel, and up to Václav Klaus have made plans and dreamed of 
reorganizing Europe, they should all have realized that the Czech Republic is a 
small, weak country. He concludes “ýeský politik by mČl být skromnČjší [a 
Czech politician should be more modest].” The Czech Republic is lost without 
Europe, Europe is in turn lost without the USA. He argues, that the Czech 
Republic can only confront the problems, which are much like those in the late 
thirties and after 1945, as part of a North American-European alliance. 
PĜemysl Janýr writes perhaps the most enlightening evaluation of Klaus’ essay 
in “Klaus’ Europeanism.”9 Janýr lauds Klaus’ attempt to define the multifaceted 
heterogeneity of Europeanism, but this is a backhanded compliment. For unlike 
Klaus, who wishes to point out the inherent faults of Europeanism, his critic 
finds the description to be a “convincing confirmation of shared European 
5 Pavel Palíšek, “Obchází Evropou strašidlo evropeismu? Tak žhavé to nebude,” Mladá
fronta dnes 22 Apr. 2006: 22. 
6 OndĜej Rut, “Z oken Pražského hradu niþení planety vidČt není,” Britské listy 27 Mar. 
2007 <http://www.blisty.cz/art/33535.html>. 
7 David Klimeš, “Klaus: hlasatel -ismu bez obsahu,” Mladá fronta dnes 3 Jul. 2006: 3. 
8 Bohumil Doležal, “Klausovo tažení proti evropeismu,” Neviditelný pes 12 Apr. 2006
<http://neviditelnypes.lidovky.cz/udalosti-klausovo-tazeni-proti-evropeismu-feg-
/p_politika.asp?c=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag>. 
9 PĜemysl Janýr, “KlausĤv evropeismus,” Britské listy 12 Apr. 2006 
<http://www.blisty.cz/art/27909.html>. 
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values that is at the same time free of any propagandistic intentions.”10 Janýr is 
thus a Czech adherent of the motto “unity in diversity.”
Klaus’ political opponents reacted severely to his essay, revealing the parties 
different view of the EU and Europe. In this context, both the KDU-ýSL and the 
ýSSD appear to belong to the Europeanists, although they are of a different 
feather. The KDU-ýSL places Petr Pithart’s reaction “Evropa, Evropané, 
evropanství,” previously published in Mladá fronta dnes on May 20, 2006, on its 
homepage.11 In choosing the title, especially the term evropanství over the 
foreign evropmeismus, Pithart makes clear that he, unlike Klaus, believes in a 
common Europe and that his article concerns Europe, not the EU. Although he 
does concede there are problems in Europe, he believes strongly in a European 
identity and professes a separate European path to unity that is culturally 
different than the path of the USA. The EU is hardly mentioned. This contrasts 
with the ýSSD’s publication “The President’s European Crossroads” by ZdenČk
Jiþínský.12 Rather than speaking of common European values, the article clearly 
promotes the positive role the European Union has and will have in 
guaranteeing peace and prosperity in the Czech Republic. Klaus thus succeeds 
in provoking the enthusiasts for Europe (Pithart) and for the EU (Jiþínský).
In addition to published reactions to Klaus’ article on Europeanism, it is possible 
to track readers’ responses in the newspapers’ Internet forums. Although these 
do not give a scientific sampling of the overall Czech reaction, they do, 
nonetheless, provide some indication of how Klaus’ views were received. When 
looking at Czech readers’ reactions, it becomes clear that they either knowingly 
share or unconsciously react to Klaus’ signals. One finds remarks such as “Celá 
EU neustále prokazuje, že to je jen další RVHP [The entire EU consistently 
shows that it is nothing more than a further COMECON (Council on Mutual 
Economic Assistance)]” and warnings of the spread of socialism in Europe.13
Some even directly recall the tragedy of 1968 when they refer to the EU as a 
“new socialism with a human face.”14
Perhaps it is therefore somewhat surprising that Klaus’ essay also evokes 
another stereotype: the specter of Munich. The EU is not only interpreted as a 
mere product of French and German interests, but the Czech Republic’s 
agreement to join the EU is equated with the Munich Agreement as well.15 One 
respondent writes that: 
výsledkem þinnosti europeistĤ je Evropa totálnČ impotentní, neschopná 
obrany pĜed nepĜítelem, který už buší na vrata a má v zemi samé silnou 
10 More explicitly: “Nevím zda to Klause potČší, ale k jeho 'mnohadimenzionální doktrínČ'
hodnotových kulturních systémĤ se explicitnČ hlásím. Mimo toho je jeho analýza 
nesmírnČ povzbudivá – vlastnČ jsem se dosud nesetkal s pĜesvČdþivČjším potvrzením 
spoleþných evropských hodnot, které by zároveĖ tak evidentnČ vyluþovalo jakékoli 
podezĜení z propagaþních úmyslĤ.”
11 <http://www.kdu.cz/default.asp?page=311&idr=133&IDCl=15558>.  
12 Originally published in “Prezidentova evropská kĜižovatka,” Právo 27 Apr. 2006 
<http://www.cssd.cz/dokumenty/archiv/archiv-2006/aktuality-clanky-rozhovory-
2006/a2186.html>. 
13 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=3>.  
14 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/diskuse.asp?ddiskuse=A060411_ 
194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=4>. 
15 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=7>.
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pátou kolonu. Z tohoto hlediska hrají europeisté naprosto stejnČ trapnou 
roli, jakou hráli usmiĜovaþi v dobČ nástupu Hitlera k moci [The result of 
Europeanists’ actions is that Europe has become completely impotent, 
unable to protect itself from an enemy that is already knocking at our 
door and has infiltrated our country. Europeanists thus play the same 
terrible role as those who followed a course of appeasement during Hitler's 
rise to power].16
Klaus is himself surprised at this connection, and unlike his tacit comparison of 
the EU and communism, one is prone to believe him when he remarks, “I never 
compared the EU’s ideology with Nazi ideology. I don’t even know where the 
interviewer got that from.”17
Of course, many in the forums reject Klaus’ views and echo Doležal’s plea for 
cooperation. On the other hand, there is a reaction to a common European 
identity and European patriotism that is not even present in the essay. Coming 
to the support of Europeanism, one respondent maintains Klaus simply hates 
Europe.18 This response in turn provokes the question, whether anyone can be 
motivated to identify with Europe. Should Czechs feel European at all? The 
somewhat flip answer is that “when the French consider themselves to be 
Europeans, then we [Czechs] can begin dealing with our own European identity 
here”19 and that although a unified Europe would perhaps be stronger than a 
nation state, no one can identify with such a supranational entity. The question 
is then posed of how this Europeanism may be related to evropanstvi.20
A lively debate ensues on the pages of a traditionally avid proponent of Klaus’ 
views, EUportal.21 It deserves special attention due to the quality of the 
arguments and the renown of those expressing them. Apart from some short, 
positive responses, a lengthy exchange takes place between “Monika” and 
EUportal’s editor, JiĜí Zahrádka. Monika attacks Klaus’ own “Klausspeak” - who 
and what are the “Europeanists” anyway? - and his misrepresentation of 
Kundera’s novel The Unbearable Lightness of Being in his essay. She does, 
however, concede Klaus makes some good points. JiĜí Pehe, known for his pro-
EU and European views, also makes an appearance to comment on Klaus’ essay 
in length in “The President’s Mistakes.” Pehe rebukes Klaus for arguing without 
evidence, for contributing to anxieties, but above all he criticizes that “Klaus, 
who otherwise as a matter of principle opposes confusing the terms Europe and 
the European Union . . . intentionally mixes them up here in order to criticize 
the EU.” Like Klimeš, Pehe argues that Klaus’ essay on Europeanism has 
nothing to do with Europe.22 Is Klaus a Euroskeptic without any concept of 
Europe? Why doesn’t Klaus deal with the cultural, historical Europe, the theme 
16 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=1>. 
17 Klaus, “Dementi þ.23.” 
18 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=7>. 
19 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=6>. 
20 <http://neviditelnypes.zpravy.cz/ 
diskuse.asp?iddiskuse=A060411_194756_p_politika_wag&razeni=&strana=7>. 
21 “Co je to evropeismus?” EUportal 10 April 2006 <http://www.euportal.cz/Articles/708-
co-je-to-evropeismus-.aspx>. 
22 “V eseji o ‘evropeismu’ zjistíme, že o Evropu v textu vĤbec nejde.” 
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evropanství and instead just address europeismus?
The answer is clear for Klaus and others in the ODS: there is nothing to deal 
with. Apart from being critical of the European Union, this is an anti-European 
discourse in the sense that it denies the relevance of any concept of Europe. 
There is neither a common European home, nor does the EU have the right to 
claim it represents Europe. Europe is a loosely defined geographic region, an 
intellectually and culturally defined civilization that can only be very generally 
and abstractly discussed. It is in a constant state of change and so 
heterogeneous that to speak of any homogeneity, unity, or shared history is 
very far fetched.23 Europe is an idea, not a thing, not a government like the EU. 
One could simply dismiss this again as populism, if it were not so popular and 
there were not further voices sharing this interpretation.
The Czech historian Dušan TĜeštík seems to share this view in his articles in The
Czechs and History in a Postmodern Purgatory.24 He begins the chapter 
“Searching for Europe's Soul” with Jacques Delor’s statement that Europe is a 
body without a soul. TĜeštík maintains that the Czech Republic did not join 
Europe, but rather a union motivated by economic pragmatism, in which values 
take a back seat.25 The average Joe (ýehona) knows that you cannot buy 
anything with the politicians words about Europe and is rightfully skeptical 
about all of the EU’s billboards. TĜeštík begins his collection of essays with the 
following foreword:
Dear Europeans! One should probably begin with exactly these words and 
an unusually long and boring speech about European citizenship, but my 
audience would begin to look around for the dandy and well-to-do 
Europeans that have arrived once again to preach about the correct 
“union” morals. We are something different than Europe. We may have 
been accepted into Europe, but neither Europe nor we are particularly 
enthusiastic about it. Both Europeans and we think that we did something 
that we had to do, because there wasn't any other way.26
TĜeštík’s introduction demonstrates two things. First, no distinction is made 
between the terms Europe and the EU; they have become synonymous. 
Second, Europe and Europeans are perceived to be a foreign Other. The author 
attempts to correct this view in the introduction by imploring his dear Czechs 
not to look for Europeans, because they are Europeans: “nemusíte se ohlížet po 
Evropanech, jste jimi.”27 However, the heading of the main part of his book 
“Europe and Us” contradicts this plea by propagating the interpretation of 
Europe as the Other.
TĜeštík, unlike Klaus, not only addresses the subject of Europeanism but also 
evropanství. He expresses the view that many Czechs with their anti-European, 
not just anti-EU stance are victims of their own history writing, in which 
Bohemia is so often depicted to be at odds with the rest of Europe. Although he 
rejects a common, objective European history – as does Klaus – he considers it 
not only possible, but even desirable, to write this history, though “this would 
23 Václav Klaus, “Turecko, Evropa a Evropská unie,” 30 Sept. 2004 <http://www.klaus.cz>. 
24 Dušan TĜeštík, ýeši a dČjiny v postmoderním oþistci (Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové 
noviny, 2007). 
25  TĜeštík 180. 
26  TĜeštík 9. 
27  TĜeštík 15. 
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be a work of the distant future.”28
Czech voices addressing European identity, both political and cultural, may be 
found not just in the political arena and academic publications, but also in 
Czech schools. Since the authors of these essays and poems should be Europe’s 
future, a closer step to a European identity, their opinions are especially 
valuable for judging European integration and the “populism” of Klaus’ views. 
In an anonymous school essay titled “Co to je vlastnČ evropanství?“ [What is 
Europeanism] a young author attempts to explain what Europeanism means to 
him or her.29 It begins with a definition: Europeanism is the belief that one may 
recognize and perhaps be proud of the characteristics and principles of Europe. 
The author argues, however, that this is impossible in practice due to the 
contradictions. The writer asks what Czechs, Russians, Spaniards and others 
really have in common and finds no answer. An excursion through history 
points only to the domination of one country by others. In the end, the author 
remarks that the word has a very individual meaning, even if it is increasingly 
used to mean something that connects us and “appears primarily in connection 
with the EU as an opposite to Americanism.” Besides being born in Europe, the 
author does not give the term any particular meaning. 
Since 1992 the European Union has also funded an annual school competition in 
the Czech Republic entitled “Evropa ve škole,” in which students from different 
grades write essays on given European themes. In the past, the topics have 
been “Living together in Europe,” “Our Histories – our European future,” and 
“Being a Citizen in a Changing Europe.” The last title itself points to a particular 
desired interpretation of Europe. Although this contest may have a political 
goal, the current essays do not always adhere to the ideals of the organizers. 
Although the theme Europeanism has not been presented, topics such as “Does 
loving your home mean loving Europe” or “My homeland Europe” come very 
close. In the first case, the Jan BĜehovský, recipient of the third prize, answers 
the title “Does loving your home mean loving Europe” in a word: “no. Just 
because I love my Czech pancakes, doesn’t mean I love all Czech cuisine. 
Moreover, comparing one’s love for Europe to one’s love for one’s homeland is 
too general and has most recently become a very popular cliché which reminds 
me all too much of something which I fortunately only know from my parents 
stories: the duty to love the Soviet Union for all eternity. Home is trust, security 
and love. And Europe? It is still only a great challenge, in part a temptation and 
a dream chase, in part the unknown, a source of worries and fear. It isn’t 
home.”30
The leaders of tomorrow's Europe share the same “populist” views found in the 
politics of the ODS, see Europeanism simply as a political ploy, yes even refer 
to the same comparisons of Europe with the Soviet Union. It is perhaps 
somewhat ironic that in selling the EU as Europe the younger generation has 
begun to reject a European identity. Perhaps a key step in addressing 
Euroskepticism and moving the project EU forward would be a differentiation 
between the EU- and Europe, free from the rhetoric of a common history and 
culture, and instead a concentration on pragmatic social and economic 
arguments, arguments even Euroskeptics often accept. 
28  TĜeštík 180. 
29 <http://referaty-seminarky.cz/co-je-to-vlastne-evropanstvi/>.  
30 <http://www.evropaveskole.cz/sbornik/sb52uvod.htm>.
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Norwegians have rejected membership in 
the European Union twice. Why? And why 
is the question of membership a non-
question in the Norwegian government 
when the Minister of Foreign Affairs is in 
favor of membership ? 
Few political issues divide the Norwegians 
more than the question of membership in 
the European Union. 
“Give Norway the right to vote in Europe,” 
says the European Movement in Norway 
on their home page.1 It is precisely this 
right to vote, or “access to the table” that 
is one of the crucial points in the 
membership debate. For example, today, 
between 80 and 90 per cent of the 
Norwegian legislation on environmental 
protection comes from the EU.2 In fact, on 
the web site of the Norwegian Govern-
ment, we can read “Norway tends to 
adjust faster to EU-legislation than the EU 
member states.”3 In August 2006 
Denmark was the only member state that 
implemented EU-directives faster than 
Norway. The 2006 survey showed that it 
took 6,43 months on average to 
implement an EU-directive in Norwegian 
legislation.4
Towards the first referendum
The first time Norway applied for 
membership in the EU was in 
April 1962. Back then the 
Norwegian Government followed 
the EFTA-countries that applied 
in 1961 (Ireland in July, Great 
Britain and Denmark in August). 
In January 1963, the French 
president Charles de Gaulle 
vetoed the membership process 
of Great Britain. The negotiations 
with Denmark, Ireland, and 
Norway were also put on hold.
In 1967 Ireland, Great Britain, 
Denmark, and Norway again 
applied for membership – and 
Charles de Gaulle once again 
denied their request.
In 1969 Charles de Gaulle left 
office, and the membership 
applications were again taken 
into consideration. In June 1970 
the European Communities 
started negotiations with the four 
countries.  
In January 1973 Denmark, 
Ireland, and Great Britain 
became members of the EU. But 
Norway did not. A majority of the 
Norwegians (53,5 per cent of 
votes cast) rejected the 
agreement and thereby 
membership in a referendum in 
September 1972. 
(More: http://www.eu-
norge.org/Norges+forhold+til+EU/hi
storikk/historikk.htm)
The European Movement in Norway sees 
this as a severe lack of democracy; others 
are making decisions for Norway while 
Norwegians have no say on the decisions 
affecting them. On the other side of the 
political spectrum, the organization No to 
the EU also opposes membership in the 
EU, claiming that Norway can do more for 
the environment as an independent actor 
outside the EU. Traditionally, the majority 
1 <http://www.jasiden.no>.  
2 <http://www.wwf.no/om_wwf/hvor_jobber_vi/i_europa/index.cfm>.
3 <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/krd/dok/NOUer/2005/NOU-2005-
06/10/2/3.html?id=390290>.  
4 <http://www.heis.no/Nyheter.aspx?docid=171>. (16 Aug. 2006)  
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of the environment organizations in Norway 
share this view. Most of them have taken a 
clear stand against membership and were 
particularly active in the fight against 
membership in the political battles before 
the referendums in 1972 and 1994.
The organization No to the EU considers the 
fact that the Norwegian government has 
never used the opportunity to veto a 
directive from the EU, a right that was 
negotiated into Norway’s agreement with 
the EU under the European Economical 
Agreement signed in 1992 a still bigger 
democratic problem.5
The use, or more precisely the non-use, of 
the veto is a repeated issue in the public 
debate in Norway. It is often claimed that 
the Norwegian Parliament would have 
rejected the EEA Agreement without the 
provision for a veto to EU legislation. 
Critical voices claim that when the 
prerogative to veto is never used the 
agreement as such is also devalued.
Democratic traditions 
Democracy, environment, trade, develop-
ment and independence on the global level 
have been among the core issues in the 
membership debate in Norway since the 
beginning and are just as crucial today.
“They fear their own people!” the org-
anization Youth against the EU claims on 
their web site.6 This comment refers to 
different governments’ opposition to the 
demand for referenda on the new EU 
constitution.
The lack of participation in EU elections is 
used as an argument against membership 
in the EU. Voter participation in Norwegian 
elections is also decreasing but not with the 
same speed as in the elections for the 
European Parliament.
5 <http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/EEAAgreement/ 
EEAAgreement>. 
6 Youth against the EU - <http://www.umeu.no>.  
The EEA Agreement 
The Agreement creating the 
European Economic Area (EEA 
Agreement) was negotiated 
between the community, the 
member states of the EU and the
EFTA countries, and was signed 
in May 1992. The EEA Agreement
entered into force on January 1, 
2004.
The EEA entitles Norway, 
Iceland, and Liechtenstein to 
participate in the European 
Single Market, while not 
assuming the full responsibilities 
of EU-membership.
The agreement gives the right to 
be consulted by the commission 
during the formulation of 
community legislation, but not 
the right to a voice in decision-
making, which is reserved 
exclusively for member states.
All new community legislation in 
areas covered by the EEA 
becomes part of the agreement 
by EEA joint committee 
decisions. It subsequently 
becomes part of the national 
legislation of the EEA EFTA 
countries. 
The EEA Agreement makes EFTA 
members the most closely linked 
countries to the EU.  
The EEA Agreement addresses 
the four fundamental pillars of 
the European Single Market, “the
four freedoms", i.e. freedom of 
movement of goods (excluding 
agriculture and fisheries, which 
are included in the Agreement 
only to a very limited extent), 
persons, services and capital.
(More:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relatio
ns/eea/index.htm)
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While voter participation in the EU Parliament elections was only 45,7% in 
2004, 77,4% of all registered voters cast a ballot in the elections for the 
Norwegian Parliament. In the 1994 referendum on Norwegian EU membership, 
the participation rate was even 89%.7
Geography counts 
If you turned Norway around with Oslo 
as it axes, the Northern part of Norway 
would reach to Rome. There has 
traditionally been a sense of mistrust in 
the more rural areas of Norway to 
everything that is decided upon centrally. 
A common argument is that the rural 
areas have less people but more land – 
and that this is where Norwegian 
resources are located. This affects the 
Norwegian Constitution in two ways:
Geographical distance to the capitol is 
compensated with more seats in Parlia-
ment, meaning that a county in the 
northern part of Norway will have more 
seats in parliament per vote and 
inhabitant than does the capitol Oslo. 
A high degree of local government auto-
nomy.
The smallest municipality in Norway is 
Utsira with 214 inhabitants. 13 of these 
are elected to the Municipal Council. 
Despite its size, the municipality has all 
the structures to ensure political 
independence from the central 
government in Norway.8
Local democracy is further illustrated by 
the large number of local newspapers, 
which again leads to Norwegians reading 
more newspapers than anyone in 
Europe.9
When one considers its population, Nor-
way with its 4.5 million inhabitants is a 
small country. Although not every Norwegian knows one of the 169 members of 
Parliament personally, it is said that every Norwegian knows someone who 
knows a member and everyone is welcomed to Parliament with his or her own 
7 Statistics Norway <http://www.ssb.no>. 
8 <http://www.utsira.kommune.no>.  
9 European Social Survey 
<http://www.forskning.no/Artikler/2005/oktober/1128326919.86>. 
Towards the 1994 referendum 
In 1986 the EU changes the decision-
making process. The establishment of an 
inner market is possible.
In 1989 the EFTA country Austria applies 
for EU membership. Formal negotiations 
on the EEA Agreement begin in 1990. 
The Schengen Convention is signed.  
Sweden sends their membership 
application in 1991, Finland in 1992. The 
EEA Agreement goes into effect in 1992. 
In a referendum in December, the 
majority of the Swiss people reject the 
idea of EU membership. 
The Norwegian Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland sends the Norwegian 
application for a membership in 
November 1992.
In January 1993, the inner market is 
established and membership 
negotiations between Norway and the 
commission start in April. Norway and 
Iceland become members of the 
European Single Market in January 
1994, when the EEA Agreement comes 
into force. 
In November 1994 52.5% of the votes 
cast rejected the Norwegian 
Government’s wish for membership in 
the EU. The EFTA countries Finland, 
Austria, and Sweden became members 
of the EU as of January 1995.
(More:http://www.eunorge.org/Norges+forh
old+til+EU/historikk/historikk.htm)  
forost-Arbeitspapier Nr. 45
38
personal history.
This gives Norwegian citizens better access 
to Parliament and parliamentarians than in 
most other countries. Moving the power to 
Brussels will of course influence this power 
structure and the opportunity to have direct 
contacts with the people in power.
On top of this, many Norwegians have a 
picture of the EU as an institution that can 
only be lobbied if you have an office in 
Brussels and a powerful organization backing 
you. Several of the debates concerning 
different directives to be implemented in 
Norwegian legislation have also helped 
create an image of the EU as an institution 
where power rests in the hands of big 
companies and their professional lobbyists in 
Brussels. As a result, more and more civil 
society organizations as well as Norwegian 
municipalities and regions have opened their 
own offices in Brussels.
Desire for local and global influence
Skepticism to moving power out of the 
country and to European institutions can be 
seen as part of a prolonged skepticism to the 
centralization of power within Norwegian 
borders. But at the same time, the 
Norwegians also have the strongest 
confidence in the United Nations of all 
Europeans: 78,2% of Norwegians trust the 
United Nations. The European average is 
44,4%.10
In fact, both proponents of as well as 
opponents to membership in the EU use 
global responsibility as an argument in 
debates. While the former claim that Norway 
should join the EU to have a say in the 
global arena, the later state that Norway 
should remain independent from the EU and 
join forces with developing countries. 
10 European Social Survey 
<http://www.forskning.no/Artikler/2005/oktober/1130147824.37>. 
Recent developments 
In 2001, the five Nordic countries 
become members of Schengen. 
Continued mobility and passport 
freedom within the five countries is 
ensured.
With the enlargement of the EU in 
2004, the EEA is also enlarged. 
The EEA’s financial mechanisms 
were established and aim to reduce 
social and economic disparities 
within the European Economic Area 
and to enable all EEA countries to 
participate fully in the Single 
Market. As part of the EEA Financial 
Program, the three EEA-EFTA states 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway 
will make a total €600 million 
available to the 10 countries that 
joined the EU and the EEA in May 
2004, as well as to Greece, 
Portugal, and Spain.
Through the Norwegian Financial 
Program, Norway will make an 
additional €567 million available to 
the 10 countries that joined the EU 
and the EEA in 2004.
Both programs run over a five-year 
period until 2009. Norway, the 
largest of the three donors, will 
contribute close to 1.14 billion 
Euro.
The EEA Financial Program will also 
provide 72 million Euro to Bulgaria 
and Romania, which joined the EEA 
in 2007, over a two-year period 
until 2009, while Norway will 
contribute an additional €68 million 
to the two new EEA members over 
the same period through bilateral 
cooperation programs. 
(More: http://www.eu-
norge.org/Norges+forhold+til+EU/histo
rikk/historikk.htm and 
www.eeagrants.org/)
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A more active approach to European policy 
How can JEF Norway be one of the most active branches of the Young European 
Federalists (JEF) when Norway is not even a member of the EU? And will 
Norway join the EU soon? 
The position of the current government is that Norway can and shall influence
the decisions that affect Norway on the level of the EU. The government, 
elected in 2005, declared that one of its goals is to participate more actively in 
the ongoing processes in the EU and to increase the knowledge about the 
institution both within the Government, within the state administration and the 
population.
The means for achieving this goal are training ministers and staff in the 
ministries, a more pro-active approach to different processes going on in the EU 
and more resources for political parties, civil society and governmental 
structures to deal with these processes. This is also 
partly the reason that Young European Federalists
has activities in Norway every year. 
The government is divided 
The government is however not at all ready to 
negotiate Norwegian membership in the EU. Although 
a majority within the party of the Prime Minister, the 
Social Democrats, would like Norway to join the EU, 
the two other parties in the current government, the 
Center Party and the Socialist Left Party, are against 
a membership.
In the government declaration adopted as the basis 
for the cooperation between three parties (The Soria 
Moria Declaration,11 named after a Norwegian fairy 
tale), the three parties state, “The government will 
not apply for Norwegian membership in the EU.” If any one of the parties brings 
up the question of sending a membership application, the coalition government 
will fall. There are also voices in the two parties opposing membership in the EU 
and critical of the EEA Agreement, although the Soria Moria Declaration clearly 
states that the “Government will co-operate with the EU based on the EEA 
Agreement.”
Norway has a majority government12 for the first time in more than 20 years – 
and it is not likely that there will be a change in government within the four-
year mandate of Parliament. The previous Government also had a similar clause 
in its declaration that defined its relationship to the EU. The former government 
consisted of the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal 
Party.
In conclusion, not only the general public, but also the political parties 
(internally and in Parliament) as well as the current government are divided on 
11 <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/Documents/Reports-and-action-
plans/Rapporter/2005/The-Soria-Moria-Declaration-on-Internati.html?id=438515>. 
12 A Government made up by parties that also have the majority in Parliament. 
EFTA
The European Free 
Trade Association was 
established in January 
1960.
The members were 
Norway, Sweden, 
Great Britain, 
Denmark,
Switzerland, Austria 
and Portugal.
Iceland became a 
member in 1979, 
Finland in 1986, and 
Liechtenstein 1991. 
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the question of membership in the EU. A full round of negotiations and 
campaigning related to a referendum on membership has twice shown to be a 
demanding exercise that leaves little interest in opening the battle over 
membership again – until there seems to be a clear majority in the population. 
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Reviewing Euroskepticism 
Kenneth Hanshew 
The preceding articles explore European identity, European integration, 
and Euroskepticism in the Czech Republic, Norway, Slovakia, and the 
countries of former Yugoslavia in both politics and general discourse. 
Discourse that questions the concept of Europe and/or the type of 
European integration represented by the EU may, however, not only be 
read in the words of newspaper articles, political speeches, intellectual 
musings, and informational pamphlets mentioned in these articles. Similar 
questioning, similar stereotypes, even the same way of viewing the EU 
and European integration may also be found in the language of 
caricatures, cartoons and political campaign posters.
The following is a selection of not only the critical, but often also 
humorous views of the EU and European integration prevailing shortly 
before and after the enlargement of the EU in 2004 and continuing to the 
present. In the first two images, the authors associate the European Union 
with totalitarianism. 
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Euroskeptik combines the emblems of the 
European Union with the hammer and sickle 
of the Soviet Union thus implying they are 
one and the same. Czech critics of the EU 
show their similar view by referring to the 
EU’s socialist nature or by even calling the EU 
Evropský svaz instead of using the official 
name Evropská unie to make the similarity to 
the Soviet Union (SovČtský svaz) clear. In 
the second, Vladimír Renþín recalls George 
Orwell’s indictment of totalitarianism 1984 by 
referring to Big Brother, who is no longer in 
the East, in the Soviet Union, but has 
now moved to Brussels. Both show 
how the new European power revives 
old anxieties. 
2003
The fear of losing one’s identity in the 
wake of European integration and 
increasing centralization also takes 
forms independent from the country’s 
historical experience.
Are you also turning to Big Brother? He has
moved, he doesn’t live in the East
anymore.
Právo 18.8.2006 
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The picture to the left with the title 
“European Integration (EU)” shows how the 
right-wing organization Národní sjednocení 
[National unity] envisions integration. 
Everyone should have the same uniform 
appearance, no matter how absurd and 
contrary to one’s nature this may be.
http://www.nsj.cz/humor.html
Vladimír Renþín’s caricature expresses a 
similar fear of 
conformity. The 
speaker reveals 
the bar code on his chest as “one of the new 
regulations from Brussels.” On the one hand, 
this is simply humorous, for it is rather 
unlikely that the EU will begin stamping its 
citizens. But on the other, the bar code 
suggests that in the vast governmental 
bureaucracy of the EU, citizens are reduced 
to the status of mere objects. In both cases, 
integration is taken as a dreadful form of 
centralization.
A new regulation from Brussels
Právo 4.7.2003 
The examples above target the EU and European integration. Others, 
however, go so far as to question the existence of any common history in 
Europe as a basis for a shared 
European home. The image of a 
battle reminds us that European 
history may be read as a series of 
small conflicts and great wars 
between rivals, not a harmonious 
joint venture inspired by shared 
values. In avoid any confusion on 
how Europeanism should be 
interpreted, the soldier remarks:
Právo 30.4.2004 
I was at the siege of La Rocheile, I’ve raped women from the North, 
hanged farmers in Brussels, was shot in Landshut, and stabbed 
Waldstein in Cheb. No, nobody is going to tell me anything about the 
new Europeanism. 
This skeptical attitude concerning the very nature of Europeanism goes 
beyond a simple critic of the EU, calling any form of European integration 
into question.
Although the cartoons and posters resulted from the study of 
Euroskeptical material in the Czech Republic from 1989 until the present, 
one finds that the ideas are not only particular to the Czech Republic. In 
fact, the images offer a brief “re-view” of similar ways of thinking and 
shared skepticism found in all the countries studied, as the careful reader 
may recognize.
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